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Opportunistic Secrecy with a
Strict Delay Constraint
Karim Khalil, O. Ozan Koyluoglu, Hesham El Gamal, and Moustafa Youssef
Abstract
We investigate the delay limited secrecy capacity of the flat fading channel under two different assumptions on
the available transmitter channel state information (CSI). The first scenario assumes perfect prior knowledge of both
the main and eavesdropper channel gains. Here, upper and lower bounds on the delay limited secrecy capacity are
derived, and shown to be tight in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. In the second scenario, only the main
channel CSI is assumed to be available at the transmitter where, remarkably, we establish the achievability of a
non-zero delay-limited secure rate, for a wide class of channel distributions, with a high probability. In the two cases,
our achievability arguments are based on a novel two-stage key-sharing approach that overcomes the secrecy outage
phenomenon observed in earlier works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many wireless applications are limited by different forms of delay constraints. These applications range from
the most basic voice communication to the more demanding multimedia streaming. However, due to its broadcast
nature, the wireless channel is vulnerable to eavesdropping and other security threats. Therefore, techniques that
satisfy both the delay limitation and the confidentiality requirement are of definite interest. This motivates our
analysis of the fundamental (information theoretic) limits of secure communication over fading channels subject to
strict deadlines.
Recent works on information theoretic security have been largely inspired by the wire-tap channel model of
Wyner [1]. In this seminal work, Wyner established the achievability of non-zero secrecy capacity when the
wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main one, by exploiting the noise to create an advantage for
the legitimate receiver. More recently, the effect of fading on the secrecy capacity was studied in [2] in the ergodic
setting. The main insight offered by this work is the achievability of a non-zero secrecy capacity, by opportunistically
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2exploiting the multi-path channel fluctuations, even when the eavesdropper channel is better than the legitimate one
on the average.
On the other side, delay limited transmission over fading channels has been well studied in different network
settings and using various traffic models. For example, in [3], the delay limited capacity notion was introduced
and the optimal power control policies were characterized in several interesting scenarios. In [4], the strict delay
limitation of [3] was relaxed by allowing for buffering the packets at the transmitter. In this setup, the asymptotic
behavior of the power-delay trade-off curve was characterized yielding valuable insights on the structure of the
optimal resource allocation strategies [4]. More recently, the scheduling problem of data transmission over a finite
delay horizon assuming perfect CSI was considered in [5]. Our work can be viewed as a generalization of [3]
whereby a secrecy constraint is imposed on the problem.
The delay limited transmission of secure data over fading channels was considered previously in [6]. In that
work, the authors attempted to send the secure information using binning techniques inspired by the wiretap channel
results. The drawback of this approach is that it fails to secure the information in the particular instants where the
eavesdropper channel gain is larger than that of the main channel. This results in the so-called secrecy outage
phenomenon (as defined in [6]). Unfortunately, in the delay limited setting, the secrecy outage can not be made to
vanish by increasing the transmission power, since it does not offer a relative advantage to the legitimate receiver,
leading to the conclusion that the delay limited secure rate achieved by this approach is equal to zero for most
channel distributions of interest [6]. This obstacle is overcome by our two-stage approach. Here, the delay sensitive
data is secured via Vernam’s one time pad approach [7] (see also [8]) using a private key, which was shared secretly
by the two legitimate nodes during previous transmissions. Since the key packets are not delay sensitive, the two
nodes can share the key by distributing its bits over many fading realizations to capitalize on the ergodic behavior
of the channel. Our result is enabled by observing that, through the appropriate rate allocation, the key bits can
be superimposed on the delay sensitive data packets so that they can be used for securing future packets. This
mechanism is referred as key renewal process in the sequel. This process requires an initialization phase to share
the key needed for securing the first data packets. However, the loss in throughput entailed by the initialization
overhead vanishes in the asymptotic limit of a large number of data packets. Our analytical results establish the
asymptotic optimality, with high SNR, of this novel approach in the scenario where both the main and eavesdropper
channel gains are known a-priori at the transmitter. When only the main channel CSI is available, this approach is
shown to achieve a non-zero constant secure rate for a wide class of quasi-static and invertible channels [3] with
high probability 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and notations used throughout
the paper. Section III focuses on the full CSI scenario whereas the case with only the main channel CSI is analyzed
in Section IV; along with some representative numerical results. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in
1We use a modified version of the ǫ-achievable rate defined in [9] to argue that our results are achievable with a vanishing probability of
secrecy outage.
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3Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is shown in Figure 1. A source node (Alice) wishes to communicate with a destination node
(Bob) over a fading channel in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). We adopt a block fading model, in which the
channel is assumed to be constant during a coherence interval and changes randomly from an interval to the next
according to a bounded continuous distribution. Also, the coherence intervals are assumed to be large enough to
allow for the use of random coding arguments. During any symbol interval i, the signals received at the destination
and the eavesdropper, respectively, are given by
y(i) = gm(i)x(i) + wm(i), (1)
z(i) = ge(i)x(i) + we(i), (2)
where x(i) is the transmitted symbol, gm(i) and ge(i) are the main channel and the eavesdropper channel gains
respectively, wm(i) and we(i) are the i.i.d. additive white complex gaussian noise with unit variance at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. We denote the power gains of the fading channels for the main and
eavesdropper channels by hm(i) = |gm(i)|2 and he(i) = |ge(i)|2, respectively. We impose the long term average
power constraint P¯ , i.e.,
E[P (h)] ≤ P¯ , (3)
where P (h) is the power allocated for the channel state h = (hm, he) and the expectation is over the channel
gains.
The source wishes to send a message W ∈ W = {1, 2, · · · ,M} to the destination while satisfying the delay and
secrecy constraints. In the following, our delay constraint is imposed by breaking our message into packets of equal
sizes, where each one is encoded independently, transmitted in only one coherence block, and decoded by the main
receiver at the end of this block. The total transmission time of n channel symbol durations is divided into coherence
intervals of length n′ channel uses; for which both hm and he remain fixed. We assume there are total of SB
number of such fading blocks. These blocks are grouped into S super-blocks, each consisting of B fading blocks.
We will further represent a fading block with tuple (s, b) such that s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , S} denotes the super-block index
and b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B} denotes the fading block index within a particular super-block. We consider the problem of
constructing (M ′, n′) codes (M = S B M ′) to transmit the message of the block (s, b), which is represented by
W (s, b) ∈ W ′ = {1, 2, . . . ,M ′}, to the receiver. Here, an (M ′, n′) code consists of the following elements: 1) a
stochastic encoder fn′(.) at the source that maps the message w(s, b) to a codeword Xn
′
(s, b) ∈ Xn
′
, and 2) a
decoding function φ: Yn∗ →W ′ at the legitimate receiver, where n∗ = (s− 1)Bn′+ bn′ denotes the total number
of the received signal dimension at the receiver at the end of the block (s, b). The average error probability of an
(M ′, n′) code is defined as
Pn
′
e (s, b) =
1
M ′
∑
w∈W′
Pr
({
φ(yn
∗
) 6= w|w is sent in block (s, b)
})
,
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4where yn∗ represents the total received signals at the legitimate receiver at the end of the block (s, b). We define the
equivocation rate Re at the eavesdropper as the entropy rate of the transmitted message over block (s, b) conditioned
on the available CSI and all the channel outputs at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
Re(s, b)
∆
=
1
n′
H(W (s, b)|Zn, hnm, h
n
e ), (4)
where hnm = {hm(1), · · · , hm(n)} and hne = {he(1), · · · , he(n)} denote the channel power gains of the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper in n symbol intervals, respectively. We consider only the perfect secrecy (in the sense
of [1]) which requires the equivocation rate Re to be arbitrarily close to the message rate. Hence, we define the
achievability of the delay limited secrecy rate and capacity, respectively, as follows.
Definition 1: The rate Rs,d is said to be an achievable delay limited secrecy rate, if for any ǫ′ > 0, there exist
a (2n
′Rs,d , n′) code such that
Pn
′
e (s, b) ≤ ǫ
′,
Re(s, b) ≥ Rs,d − ǫ
′ (5)
for every fading block (s, b), s 6= 1, and for sufficiently large n,B. The delay limited secrecy capacity, Cs,d, is
defined as the supremum of the achievable delay limited perfect secrecy rates.
Here, if the secrecy constraint (5) is not satisfied for a given block, then the corresponding block is said to be
in secrecy outage, the probability of which is defined as follows.
Definition 2: For a given ǫ′ > 0, the probability of secrecy outage for the block (s, b) evaluated at rate Rs,d is
given by
Pout(s, b, Rs,d, ǫ
′) , Pr ({Re(s, b) ≤ Rs,d − ǫ′}) . (6)
Now, we define a modified version of the ǫ-achievable rate notion given by [9] (see also [10]) for the secrecy
outage phenomenon.
Definition 3: The rate Rs,d(ǫ) is said to be an ǫ-achievable delay limited secrecy rate, if for any ǫ′ > 0, there
exists a (2n′Rs,d(ǫ), n′) code such that
Pn
′
e (s, b) ≤ ǫ
′
Pout(s, b, Rs,d(ǫ), ǫ
′) ≤ ǫ (7)
for every fading block (s, b), s 6= 1, and for sufficiently large n,B. The ǫ-delay limited secrecy capacity, Cs,d(ǫ),
is defined as the supremum of the achievable delay limited secrecy rates with secrecy outage probability less than
ǫ.
We note that in our achievability results, an initialization phase occurs during the first super-fading block (s = 1),
and its duration is negligible as S → ∞. This explains why the requirements of Definitions 1 and 3 are satisfied
for every fading block (s, b) with s 6= 1.
Finally, we give some notational remarks. We denote the delay limited secrecy rate and capacity as RFs,d, CFs,d,
respectively, for the full CSI scenario, where both gm and ge are known a-priori at the transmitter. For the main
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5CSI scenario, where only gm is known a-priori at the transmitter, the delay limited secrecy rate, secrecy capacity,
ǫ-achievable secrecy rate, and ǫ-secrecy capacity, are denoted respectively by RMs,d, CMs,d, RMs,d(ǫ) and CMs,d(ǫ). We
let [x]+ = max{x, 0}. log(·) denotes the base-2 logarithm. Throughout the sequel, the expectations are taken with
respect to the random channel gains.
III. FULL TRANSMITTER CSI
First, we give a simple upper bound on the delay limited secrecy capacity. This bound will be used to establish
the optimality of the proposed two-stage approach in the high SNR regime.
Theorem 1: The delay limited secrecy capacity when both gm and ge are available at the transmitter, CFs,d, is
upper bounded by
CFs,d ≤ max
P (h)
s.t. E[P(h)]≤P¯
min
{
RFs , R
F
d
}
, (8)
where RFs and RFd are given as follows.
RFs = E [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+
RFd = min
h
log(1 + P (h)hm)
Proof: Consider an arbitrary power allocation scheme P (h). Since imposing delay constraint can only degrade
the performance, we upper bound the achievable delay limited secrecy rate with the ergodic secrecy rate as
RFs,d ≤ R
F
s . (9)
We also have
RFs,d ≤ R
F
d , (10)
since imposing the secrecy constraint can not increase the achievable rate. Then, combining (9) and (10), and
maximizing over P (h), we obtain
RFs,d ≤ max
P (h)
min{RFd , R
F
s }, (11)
which proves our claim.
The following result establishes a lower bound on the delay limited secrecy capacity using our novel two-
stage approach. The key idea is to share a private key between Alice and Bob, without being constrained by the
delay limitation. This key is, then, used to secure the delay sensitive data while overcoming the secrecy outage
phenomenon. In the steady state, the key renewal process takes place by superimposing the key on the delay
sensitive traffic. More precisely, as outlined in the proof, the delay sensitive traffic (secured by the previously
shared key) serves as a randomization signal in the binning scheme used to secure the current key. Finally, since he
is known a-priori at the transmitter, one can further increase the delay limited secrecy rate by dedicating a portion
of the secure rate to the delay sensitive traffic (as controlled by the function q(h) in the following theorem).
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6Theorem 2: The delay limited secrecy capacity in the full CSI scenario, CFs,d, is lower bounded by the following
achievable rate.
CFs,d ≥ R
F
s,d = max
P (h), q(h)
s.t. E[P(h)]≤P¯
[
min
h
{R1(h) +R2(h)}
]
, (12)
where
Rs(h) = [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+
,
Rk(h) = [log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)q(h))]
+, (13)
R2(h) = Rs(h)−Rk(h),
q(h) ≥ he, ∀he, and R1(h) is chosen to satisfy the following
E[R1(h)] ≤ E[Rk(h)]
R1(h) ≤ min {log(1 + P (h)hm), log(1 + P (h)he)} (14)
Proof: Consider a fixed pair (hm, he), a power control policy P (h) satisfying E[P (h)] ≤ P¯ , and an arbitrary
function q(·) such that q(h) ≥ he. The achievable rate is obtained by finding the minimum rate over the pair
(hm, he), to satisfy our strict delay constraint, and then maximizing over all power control policies and functions
q(h). We start the proof by defining the different rates in (12), (13), (14): Rs(h) is the instantaneous secrecy rate
supported by the channel, Rk(h) is the rate used to share the private key, R2(h) is the delay limited secrecy rate
of the data that is transmitted without the key, and R1(h) is the rate of the data sent via the one time pad scheme.
Moreover, we define the additional randomization rate by
Rx(h) = min {log(1 + P (h)hm), log(1 + P (h)he)} −R1(h) (15)
Our Two-stage Scheme: We divide the message W ∈ W = {1, 2, · · · , 2nRFs,d} into (S − 1)B data packets
D(s, b), each encoded independently and sent with rate RFs,d during the block of the channel where s ∈ {2, · · · , S}
and b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B}. We further divide each data packet into two parts: D˜1(s, b) which is sent as an open message
(after being encrypted by the key) and D2(s, b) which is sent as a secure message. Our scheme uses a separation
strategy similar to [11] by sending public and private messages simultaneously. But in contrast to [11], we exploit
the fading channel to secure the key, and hence, the message. We now describe the initial key generation and key
renewal processes. For the very first B blocks (the super-block s = 1), we generate random key bits, K(1), and
then transmit them from Alice to Bob securely. Utilizing the ergodicity of the channel, we can transmit a key of
an approximate length n′BE[Rk(h)] bits [2]. Then, for any super-block s > 1, we will use the key K(s− 1) for
the one time pad, and also generate a new key K(s) for the use in the next super-block. Here, to secure the open
packet of block (s, b), we use n′R1(h) bits from the remaining bits of the key K(s− 1), represented by K˜(s, b),
to encrypt the data packet D˜1(s, b) using one time pad encryption:
D1(s, b) = D˜1(s, b)⊕ K˜(s, b). (16)
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7The encoder will declare an encoding error, if there are not sufficient key bits left in K(s − 1) for the one time
pad encryption. To summarize, during the block (s, b), four messages are combined together and sent over the
channel:
1) D1(s, b) is mapped into W1(s, b) ∈ W1 = {1, 2, · · · , 2n′R1(h)}.
2) D2(s, b) is mapped into W2(s, b) ∈ W2 = {1, 2, · · · , 2n′R2(h)}.
3) The key bits Dk(s, b) are mapped into Wk(s, b) ∈ Wk = {1, 2, · · · , 2n′Rk(h)}.
4) Additional randomization is mapped into Wx(s, b) ∈ Wx = {1, 2, · · · , 2n′Rx(h)}.
Codebook Generation and Encoding: Our random coding arguments rely on an ensemble of codebooks
generated according to a zero-mean Gaussain distribution with variance P (h). If there are enough number of
key bits for the one time pad scheme (i.e., no encoding error), the encoder will work as follows. For a given
block (s, b), let R = log(1 + P (h)hm(s, b)) − ǫ. When hm(s, b) ≤ he(s, b), we have one of 2n
′(R1(h)+Rx(h))
open messages, denoted by the pair (w1, wx), to be sent. To encode the message (w1, wx), the encoder selects the
codeword Xn′(w1, wx) from the chosen codebook. On the other hand, when hm(s, b) ≥ he(s, b), a binning scheme
(see, e.g., [1]) is used to send secret bits over the channel. We first generate a Gaussian codebook consisting of
2n
′R codewords, represented by Xn′ , and then independently assign each of them to one of 2n′(Rk(h)+R2(h)) bins,
where the bin index is (wk, w2), according to a uniform distribution. This ensures that any of the sequences are
equally likely to be within any of the bins. Each bin has 2n′(R1(h)+Rx(h)) sequences with codeword index denoted
by (w1, wx). Accordingly, a sequence is represented by the tuple of indices (wk, w2, w1, wx). To encode a particular
key-message pair, the encoder chooses a codeword indexed by (w1, wx) from the bin indexed by (wk, w2), i.e.,
Xn
′
(wk, w2, w1, wx), and send it over the channel. We note that wx is uniformly chosen among Wx and w1 is
determined by the data D˜1(s, b) and the corresponding key bits of the previous super-block K˜(s, b), and hence
uniformly distributed over W1.
Error Analysis: For each fading block (s, b), we denote the encoding and decoding error events by Eenc(s, b)
and Edec(s, b), respectively. Then, we write the error probability at the receiver as follows.
Pn
′
e (s, b) = Pr{Eenc(s, b)}+ Pr{Edec(s, b)|E
c
enc(s, b)} (17)
Since we only impose a constraint on E[R1(h)] in (14), there will be a non-zero probability that the key bits
fall short. In such a case the encoder will declare an error. Hence, we can write the following bound.
Pr{Eenc(s, b)} ≤ Pr
{
B∑
b=1
R1(s, b) >
B∑
b=1
Rk(s− 1, b)
}
(18)
Here, from the strong law of large numbers and from (14), we see that the right hand side of (18) and hence
Pr{Eenc(s, b)} can be arbitrarily made small as B →∞.
Now, it remains to show that Pr{Edec(s, b)|Ecenc(s, b)} can be arbitrarily made small. This follows as n′ → ∞,
by applying the asymptotic equipartition property and jointly typical decoding [12]. In particular, for hm(s, b) ≤
he(s, b), the messages w1 and wx; and for hm(s, b) ≥ he(s, b), the messages w1, wx, wk , and w2 can be transmitted
reliably. Furthermore, as B →∞, the average key rate E[Rk(h)] is achievable within any super-block [2].
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8Equivocation Computation: Here, we show that the secrecy condition given by (5) is satisfied for each fading
block (s, b), s > 1. We can write
n′Re(s, b)
(a)
= H(D˜1(s, b), D2(s, b)|Z
n, hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜1(s, b), D2(s, b)|Z
n′(1, 1), Zn
′
(1, 2), · · · , Zn
′
(s, b), hnm, h
n
e )
(b)
= H(D˜1(s, b), D2(s, b)|Z
n′(s, b), ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D2(s, b)|Z
n′(s, b), ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
+H(D˜1(s, b)|D2(s, b), Z
n′(s, b), ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) (19)
where ZBn′(s−1) = Zn′(s−1, 1), Zn′(s−1, 2), · · · , Zn′(s−1, B) is the output of the channel at the eavesdropper
in the previous super-block s−1, (a) follows from splitting the data D(s, b) into the two parts D˜1(s, b) and D2(s, b),
and (b) follows from the independence between block (s, b) and other received signals at the eavesdropper. We now
focus on the first term in (19). We note that, in the case where hm < he, no secret bits are sent and hence the first
term is zero. When hm > he, in addition to Wx(s, b), we use the data D1(s, b) as a randomization signal to secure
the messages D2(s, b) and Dk(s, b). In this case, the first term in (19) can be lower bounded by the following two
steps. First,
1
n′
H(D2(s, b), Dk(s, b)|Z
n′(s, b), ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(a)
=
1
n′
H(D2(s, b), Dk(s, b)|Z
n′(s, b), hnm, h
n
e )
(b)
≥
1
n′
H(D2(s, b), Dk(s, b))− ǫ
(c)
=
1
n′
H(D2(s, b)) +H(Dk(s, b))− ǫ (20)
where (a) follows from the independence of (D2(s, b), Dk(s, b)) and the previous super-block, (b) is a result of using
the scheme in [2] and the results of [1], i.e., the secrecy of D2(s, b) and Dk(s, b), along with the appropriate choice
of the randomization rate such that R1(h) + Rx(h) = I(X(s, b);Z(s, b)) and (c) follows from the independence
of D2(s, b) and Dk(s, b). Second, from (20), we have
1
n′
(H(D2|Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) +H(Dk|D2, Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )) ≥
1
n′
H(D2) +
1
n′
H(Dk)− ǫ,
implying
1
n′
H(D2|Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) ≥
1
n′
H(D2) +
1
n′
I(Dk;D2, Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )− ǫ
≥
1
n′
H(D2)− ǫ (21)
where we have dropped the index (s, b) for simplicity of notation and the last inequality follows from the fact that
mutual information is non-negative.
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9The second term in (19) is lower bounded as
1
n′
H(D˜1|D2, Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) =
1
n′
H(D˜1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
I(D˜1;Z
n′ , D2|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
=
1
n′
H(D˜1|h
n
m, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
I(D˜1;Z
n′ |ZBn
′
(s− 1), D2, h
n
m, h
n
e ) (22)
since D˜1 is independent of ZBn
′
(s− 1) and D2. The second term in (22) is upper bounded as
1
n′
I(D˜1;Z
n′ |ZBn
′
(s− 1), D2, h
n
m, h
n
e ) ≤
1
n′
I(D˜1;Z
n′ , D1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), D2, h
n
m, h
n
e )
=
1
n′
H(D˜1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), D2, h
n
m, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
H(D˜1|Z
n′ , D1, Z
Bn′(s− 1), D2, h
n
m, h
n
e )
(a)
=
1
n′
H(D˜1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
H(D˜1|D1, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
=
1
n′
I(D˜1;D1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
=
1
n′
H(D1|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
H(D1|D˜1, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
=
1
n′
H(D˜1 ⊕ K˜|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
−
1
n′
H(K˜|D˜1, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(b)
≤
1
n′
H(D˜1 ⊕ K˜)−
1
n′
H(K˜|D˜1, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(c)
= R1(h)−
1
n′
H(K˜|ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) (23)
where (a) follows from the conditional independence of D˜1 on Zn′ and D2 given D1 and ZBn′(s− 1), (b) follows
from the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, and (c) follows from the uniform distribution of K˜ and
the independence of K˜ and D˜1 given ZBn
′
(s− 1).
Using the same argument as in (20) and (21), and from (18), it is straightforward to see
1
n′
H(K˜|ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) ≥
1
n′
H(K˜)− ǫ
= R1(h)− ǫ. (24)
Substituting this in (23) and (22), we get
1
n′
H(D˜1|D2, Z
n′ , ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) ≥
1
n′
H(D˜1)− ǫ (25)
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Finally, combining (19), (21), and (25) completes the proof.
In the previous result, the achievable rate satisfies the requirements given by the Definition 1. Consequently, the
outage probability is zero with the proposed scheme. We also remark that, with the above achievability scheme, the
initialization phase is over the first super-block, during which the data is not transmitted. With a simple modification,
the data can also be transmitted during the first super-block by sacrificing the security of only the corresponding
packets, which is negligibly small compared to the whole message.
The final step in this section is to establish the asymptotic optimality of the proposed security scheme in the
high SNR regime. The following result achieves this objective by showing that the upper and lower bounds of
Theorems 1 and 2 match in this asymptotic scenario for a wide class of invertible channels.
Lemma 3: In an asymptotic regime of high SNR, i.e., P¯ →∞, the delay limited secrecy capacity is given by
lim
P¯→∞
CFs,d = Ehm>he
[
log
(
hm
he
)]
, (26)
assuming that E
[
1
min(he,hm)
]
is finite. Moreover, the capacity is achieved by the proposed one-time pad encryption
scheme coupled with the key renewal process.
Proof: We only need to consider the lower bound as the right hand side of (26) is the ergodic secrecy capacity
in the high SNR regime, which is by definition an upper bound on the delay limited secrecy capacity. To this end,
in the proposed scheme, we set q(h) = he resulting in R2(h) = 0. Furthermore, we let P (h) = cmin(he,hm) , where
c is a constant, which is chosen according to the average power constraint. The achievable rate expression in the
high SNR regime is then given by
lim
P¯→∞
RFs,d = lim
P¯→∞
min
h
R1(h), (27)
where R1(h) is chosen to satisfy
E[R1(h)] ≤ E
[
[log(1 + P (h)hm)− log(1 + P (h)he)]
+
]
R1(h) ≤ log(1 + c) (28)
As P¯ → ∞, it is easy to see that c → ∞ since E
[
1
min(he,hm)
]
is finite, implying that the second constraint in
(28) is loose. Also, it is easy to see that the first constraint converges to the right hand side of the lemma. Then,
by choosing R1(h) = Ehm>he
[
log
(
hm
he
)]
, both constraints of (28) are satisfied and hence the result is proved.
IV. ONLY MAIN CHANNEL CSI
In this section we assume that only the legitimate receiver CSI is available at the transmitter. First, we have the
following upper bound.
Theorem 4: The delay limited secrecy capacity when only the legitimate receiver channel state is available at
the transmitter, CMs,d, is upper bounded by
CMs,d ≤ max
P(hm)
s.t. E[P(hm)]≤P¯
min
{
RMs , R
M
d
} (29)
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where RMs and RMd are given as follows.
RMs = E [log(1 + P (hm)hm)− log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+
RMd = min
hm
log(1 + P (hm)hm)
Proof: The proof follows the same argument as that of Theorem 1 with the power control policy P (hm).
The achievability scheme in this scenario is different from the previous scenario in two key aspects: 1) the lack
of knowledge about he forces us to secure the whole delay sensitive traffic with the one time pad approach (i.e.,
setting the rate R2(h) to zero) and 2) the binning scheme of the key renewal process must now operate on the
level of the super-block to average-out the fluctuations in he. On the other hand, the delay sensitive packet must
be decoded after each block. This makes the use of the delay sensitive packet as a randomization signal a rather
challenging task. Therefore, the achievable rate reported in the following result is obtained by superimposing the
binning scheme (used to secure the key) on the delay limited traffic (secured by the key bits sent in the previous
super-block).
Theorem 5: For any given arbitrarily small ǫ, the ǫ-delay limited secrecy capacity in the only main CSI scenario,
CMs,d(ǫ), is lower bounded by the following ǫ-achievable rate.
CMs,d(ǫ) ≥ R
M
s,d(ǫ) = max
P(hm)
s.t. E[P(hm)]≤P¯
min
{
Rs, R
M
d
}
, (30)
where
Rs = E[log(1 + P (hm)hm)−R
M
s,d(ǫ)− log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+, (31)
RMd = min
hm
log(1 + P (hm)hm). (32)
Proof: First, fix a power control policy P (hm). The achievable rate is then obtained by maximizing over all
power control policies satisfying the average power constraint. We start by describing our scheme. We divide the
channel uses into super-blocks and further divide each super-block into blocks such that the coherence interval is n′
symbols as considered in the proof of Theorem 2. In this scenario, we utilize the achievable secrecy rate within a
block only for the key generation. That is, data is transmitted only by using the one-time pad encryption in contrast
to the scheme used in Theorem 2. Due to the lack of knowledge of he, the key is decoded at the end of each
super-block whereas the data packets are still decoded block by block using the key sent in the previous super-block.
A given message W ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
M
s,d(ǫ)}, is divided into (S − 1) B data packets, each represented by D˜(s, b)
for s ∈ {2, · · · , S} and b ∈ {1, · · · , B}, where each packet is sent with rate RMs,d(ǫ) during the corresponding
block of the channel. The data packet D˜(s, b) is transmitted along with the generated key using the one-time pad
scheme. Initial key generation and key renewal is similar to the scheme in Theorem 2. We remark that, similar to
Theorem 2, the initialization phase duration becomes negligible as S →∞.
Codebook Generation and Encoding: Let R = min{Rs, RMd }. For any given block (s, b), s > 1, we use the
n′R remaining bits from the key K(s − 1) and denote corresponding bits as K˜(s, b). These bits are used in a
October 30, 2018 DRAFT
12
one-time pad scheme to construct
D(s, b) = D˜(s, b)⊕ K˜(s, b) (33)
The encrypted bits are then mapped to a message w(s, b) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2n′R}. For the key renewal process, the
binning scheme is constructed over the super block s, as in the achievable scheme used in [2], such that the output
bits of the encoder are divided into B independent blocks each consists of n′[log(1+P (hm(s, b))hm(s, b))−R−ǫ]
bits where b ∈ {1, 2, · · · , B} is the coherence interval. We then combine those bits with the n′R reserved bits
for the encrypted data packet and encode them using a member of the generated Gaussian codebook ensemble,
which has 2n′[log(1+hm(s,b)P (hm(s,b)))−ǫ] codewords. The channel input, denoted by Xn′(s, b), corresponding to the
message from the code is sent from the transmitter.
Error Analysis: Each codeword is decoded at the end of the block releasing the delay sensitive packet. Following
the same argument used in proof of Theorem 2, Pn′e (s, b) can be made arbitrarily small as n′ →∞ for each (s, b).
The key bits are decoded at the end of the binning codeword (i.e., super block) following the same argument used
in [2]. Therefore, as n′ →∞ and B →∞, the proposed key rate is achievable, where the encrypted data bits are
not used as a part of the randomization message.
Equivocation Computation: We will show that, for the given ǫ (can be arbitrarily small) and for any given
ǫ′ > 0,
Pout(s, b, Rs,d(ǫ), ǫ
′) ≤ ǫ
with the proposed scheme. The equivocation per block for arbitrary chosen block (s, b) is given by
n′Re(s, b) = H(D˜(s, b)|Z
n, hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜|Zn
′
(1, 1), Zn
′
(1, 2), · · · , Zn
′
(S,B), hnm, h
n
e )
(a)
= H(D˜|Zn
′
(s, b), ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜|ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )− I(D˜;Z
n′ |ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(b)
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )− I(D˜;Z
n′ |ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
≥ H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )− I(D˜;Z
n′ , D|ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )−H(D˜|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) +H(D˜|Z
n′ , D, ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(c)
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )−H(D˜|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) +H(D˜|D,Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )− I(D˜;D|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )−H(D|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) +H(D|D˜, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
≥ H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )−H(D˜ ⊕ K˜) +H(K˜|D˜, Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e )
(d)
= H(D˜|hnm, h
n
e )−H(D˜ ⊕ K˜) +H(K˜|Z
Bn′(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) (34)
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where ZBn′(s− 1) = Zn′(s− 1, 1), Zn′(s− 1, 2), · · · , Zn′(s− 1, B) is the output of the channel in the previous
super-block s − 1, the index (s, b) is omitted in D˜(s, b) and K˜(s, b), (a) follows from the independence between
block (s, b) and other transmissions, (b) follows from the independence of D˜ and ZBn′(s − 1), (c) follows from
the independence between D˜ and Zn′ given D and ZBn′(s− 1), and (d) follows from the independence of K˜ and
D˜ given ZBn′(s− 1).
It remains to bound the last term in (34). Here, if we satisfy
1
n′
H(K˜|ZBn
′
, hnm, h
n
e ) ≥
1
n′
H(K˜)− ǫ′, (35)
we have, from (34), that
Re(s, b) ≥ Rs,d − ǫ
′.
Therefore, the secrecy outage event happens once (35) is not satisfied with the given ǫ′. We denote this event as
follows.
O(ǫ′) ,
{
1
n′
H(K˜|ZBn
′
, hnm, h
n
e ) <
1
n′
H(K˜)− ǫ′
}
(36)
Consequently, we will use the bound
Pout(s, b, Rs,d(ǫ), ǫ
′) ≤ Pr {O(ǫ′)} (37)
in order to show that the outage probability can be made less than ǫ.
Following the argument given in [2], one can see that the following key rate can be achieved with perfect secrecy
(as n′ →∞ and B →∞).
Rs = E[log(1 + P (hm)hm)−R− log(1 + P (hm)he)]
+
with
1
n′B
H(K(s− 1)|ZBn
′
(s− 1), hnm, h
n
e ) ≥
1
n′B
H(K(s− 1))− ǫ1 (38)
where ZBn′(s − 1) is the received signal by Eve for the super-block s − 1 and ǫ1 > 0 is arbitrarily small as
n′, B →∞. Here, we denote the number of blocks within the super block s− 1 for which the event O(ǫ′) holds
as β. Then, from (36) and (38), we conclude that n′ǫ′β ≤ n′Bǫ1, which further implies
Pr{O(ǫ′)} = lim
B→∞
β
B
≤ lim
B→∞
ǫ1
ǫ′
.
At this point, as ǫ1 can be arbitrarily made small as n′, B → ∞, we conclude from (36) that, for any given
arbitrarily small ǫ′ and ǫ
Pout(s, b, Rs,d(ǫ), ǫ
′) ≤ ǫ
for sufficiently large n′ and B.
We note that, when only the main CSI is available, we followed the ǫ-achievability notion given by definition 3
with some arbitrarily small ǫ, which means that the above claimed rate is achievable with perfect secrecy for every
realization of the channel except for a subset whose probability can be arbitrarily made small.
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Finally, we report numerical results that validate our theoretical claims. In the full CSI case, we set q(h) = he
(hence R2(h) = 0) and use channel inversion power control policy for the achievable rate. We first set both hm
and he to be independent and identically distributed Chi-Square random variables with four degrees of freedom.
Remarkably, as shown in the upper two curves in Fig. 2, even with these, in general suboptimal, choices of q(h)
and P (h), the lower and upper bounds coincide in the high SNR regime. The same trend is observed in the lower
two curves of the figure corresponding to the case with E[he] = 2E[hm]. Figure 3 corresponds to the case where
only the main channel CSI is available at the transmitter. Here, the channel inversion power control policy is used
for both the upper and lower bounds. The achievability of a non-zero delay limited rate is evident even for the case
in which the eavesdropper channel is better than the main channel on the average.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the delay limited secrecy capacity of the slow-fading channel under different assumptions on
the transmitter CSI. Our achievability arguments are based on a novel two-stage scheme that allows for overcoming
the secrecy outage phenomenon for a wide class of channels. The scheme is based on sharing a delay tolerant
private key, using random binning, and then using the key to encrypt the the delay sensitive packets in a one time
pad format. For the full CSI case, our scheme is shown to be asymptotically optimal, i.e., at high SNR regime, for
many relevant channel distributions. When only the main channel CSI is available, the two-stage scheme achieves
a non-zero delay-limited secure rate, with high probability, for invertible channels. Finally, one can easily identify
several avenues for future works. For example, 1) obtaining sharp capacity results for finite values of SNR, 2)
extending the results to multiuser scenarios, 3) characterizing the optimal power control policies, and 4) extending
the framework to bursty traffic by allowing for buffer delays.
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for the Full CSI. E[he] = E[hm] in case 1, and E[he] = 2 E[hm] in case 2.
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Fig. 3. Simulation results for the Main CSI. E[he] = E[hm] in case 1, and E[he] = 2 E[hm] in case 2.
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